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The relationship between moral hazard and insurance fraud
http://hdl.handle.net/10069/32374
http://hdl.handle.net/10069/323745c357566-28d1-4543-b8e5-3147377a61f3
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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JRF14_120.pdf (98.4 kB)
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Item type | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2013-06-19 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | The relationship between moral hazard and insurance fraud | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Corporate governance | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Fraud | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Insurance | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Insurance companies | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Insurance fraud | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Insurance market | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Moral hazard | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
資源タイプ | journal article | |||||
著者 |
Okura, Mahito
× Okura, Mahito |
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抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the insurance market in which moral hazard and insurance fraud coexist. In this situation, this research examines the relationship between moral hazard and insurance fraud. Also, this research shows how the amount of policyholder's effort to lower accident probability changes when insurance firm increases their investment in preventing insurance fraud. Design/methodology/approach – Using a theoretical model containing five-stages, the author sheds light on how the possibility of insurance fraud affects the amount of policyholder's effort. Findings – The main results of this research are as follows. First, the amount of policyholder's effort is a weakly monotone decreasing function of the insurance firm's investment in preventing insurance fraud. Second, unlike in previous moral hazard models, the policyholder chooses a strictly positive amount of effort even in the full insurance case because the possibility of insurance fraud gives an incentive to realize policyholder's effort. Third, the amount of insurance firm's investment in preventing insurance fraud depends on whether it wants to give an additional incentive to policyholder's effort in exchange for realizing the possibility of insurance fraud. Originality/value – This is the first paper to investigate the relationship between moral hazard and insurance fraud by using the microeconomic theory. |
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書誌情報 |
Journal of Risk Finance, The 巻 14, 号 2, p. 120-128, 発行日 2013 |
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出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Emerald Group Publishing Limited | |||||
ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 15265943 | |||||
DOI | ||||||
関連タイプ | isVersionOf | |||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | 10.1108/15265941311301161 | |||||
権利 | ||||||
権利情報 | This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/15265941311301161. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
出版タイプ | AM | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||
引用 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | Journal of Risk Finance, The, 14(2), pp.120-128; 2013 |