@article{oai:nagasaki-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00017960,
 author = {村田, 省三},
 issue = {3},
 journal = {經營と經濟},
 month = {Dec},
 note = {In this paper we consider quantity settinng Cournot duopoly games and Stackelberg games with perfect information, in the case that one firm has decreasing cost because of external economy. If there is such external economy, the point of Stackelberg equilibrium may locate left to Cournot one, and the convexity of isoprofit curve would change on one's best reply curve. And in some case, Stakelberg point could be unique equilibirium point of the game. We show the proper game which has property of this feature., 經營と經濟. 2008, 88(3), p.291-298},
 pages = {291--298},
 title = {外部経済と先手・後手ゲームについて},
 volume = {88},
 year = {2008}
}