{"created":"2023-05-15T16:34:49.478708+00:00","id":7580,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"183afde9-c778-461f-a9fa-6a0a8046fe15"},"_deposit":{"created_by":2,"id":"7580","owners":[2],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"7580"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:nagasaki-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00007580","sets":["82:215"]},"author_link":["31694","31695"],"item_2_biblio_info_6":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2012-07-28","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"1","bibliographicPageEnd":"48","bibliographicPageStart":"39","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"1","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Business Systems Review"}]}]},"item_2_description_4":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"The purpose of this study is to consider the following two questions by examining insurance products as credence goods. First, whether the insurance firm chooses the truth telling when it sells good-type or bad-type insurance product? Second, what is the effect of the allocation of the burden of proof between insurance firm and consumer? First, there are two types of equilibrium in the model. The insurance firm always chooses the truth telling when it sells good-type insurance product in both types of equilibrium. The second type of the equilibrium realizes when the ratio of good-type insurance products is relatively low. Second, what the insurance firm bears a greater burden of proof is not desirable because it lowers the probability of truth telling. This result is not consistent with the general opinion that the insurance firms should bear a greater burden of proof for protecting the consumers.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_2_description_63":{"attribute_name":"引用","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Business Systems Review, 1(1), pp.39-48; 2012","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_2_publisher_33":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"Business Systems Laboratory"}]},"item_2_relation_12":{"attribute_name":"DOI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type":"isIdenticalTo","subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"10.7350/BSR.A05.2012","subitem_relation_type_select":"DOI"}}]},"item_2_rights_13":{"attribute_name":"権利","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_rights":"Business Systems Review by Business Systems Laboratory is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.Based on a work at www.business-systems-review.org.Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://www.business-systems-review.org/."}]},"item_2_source_id_7":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"22803866","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_2_version_type_16":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Okura, Mahito"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Lee, Yunho"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2020-12-21"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"BSR1_39.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"1.6 MB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"BSR1_39.pdf","url":"https://nagasaki-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/7580/files/BSR1_39.pdf"},"version_id":"063536dc-a7ac-49e6-9530-d79539b09d1c"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Insurance","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Game theory","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Credence goods","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Burden of proof","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Asymmetric information","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"journal article","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Insurance as Credence Goods: On the Allocation of the Burden of Proof","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Insurance as Credence Goods: On the Allocation of the Burden of Proof"}]},"item_type_id":"2","owner":"2","path":["215"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-06-25"},"publish_date":"2013-06-25","publish_status":"0","recid":"7580","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Insurance as Credence Goods: On the Allocation of the Burden of Proof"],"weko_creator_id":"2","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-05-16T02:21:25.231255+00:00"}