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What Is True Halving in the Payoff Matrix of Game Theory?
http://hdl.handle.net/10069/37241
http://hdl.handle.net/10069/372418695d823-60c5-45f5-afc7-b9e7032d7df2
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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PLoS11_159670.pdf (1.4 MB)
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Item type | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2017-05-09 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | What Is True Halving in the Payoff Matrix of Game Theory? | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
資源タイプ | journal article | |||||
著者 |
Ito, Hiromu
× Ito, Hiromu× Katsumata, Yuki× Hasegawa, Eisuke× Yoshimura, Jin |
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抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strategies: (1) the interpretation based on the utility criterion derived from expected utility theory and (2) the interpretation based on the quantitative criterion (amount of gain) derived from validity in the empirical context. A dynamic decision theory has recently been developed in which dynamic utility is a conditional (state) variable that is a function of the current wealth of a decision maker. We applied dynamic utility to the equal division in dove-dove contests in the hawk-dove game. Our results indicate that under the utility criterion, the half-share of utility becomes proportional to a player’s current wealth. Our results are consistent with studies of the sense of fairness in animals, which indicate that the quantitative criterion has greater validity than the utility criterion. We also find that traditional analyses of repeated games must be reevaluated. | |||||
書誌情報 |
PLOS ONE 巻 11, 号 8, p. e0159670, 発行日 2016-08-03 |
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出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Public Library of Science | |||||
EISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 19326203 | |||||
DOI | ||||||
関連タイプ | isIdenticalTo | |||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | 10.1371/journal.pone.0159670 | |||||
権利 | ||||||
権利情報 | c 2016 Ito et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
引用 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | PLOS ONE, 11(8), e0159670; 2016 |