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Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation
http://hdl.handle.net/10069/40313
http://hdl.handle.net/10069/40313809bb453-2987-447d-b772-678005b084eb
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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RSO7_200891.pdf (1.2 MB)
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Item type | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2020-10-06 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | altruism | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | evolutionary games | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | expected utility theory | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | social dilemma | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | social viscosity | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
資源タイプ | journal article | |||||
著者 |
Ito, Hiromu
× Ito, Hiromu× Tanimoto, Jun |
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抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle. |
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書誌情報 |
Royal Society Open Science 巻 7, 号 8, p. 200891, 発行日 2020-08-05 |
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出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Royal Society Publishing | |||||
ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 20545703 | |||||
EISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 20545703 | |||||
DOI | ||||||
関連タイプ | isIdenticalTo | |||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | 10.1098/rsos.200891 | |||||
権利 | ||||||
権利情報 | c 2020 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited. | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
引用 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | Royal Society Open Science, 7(8), art.no.200891; 2020 |